Career policy and research output by Van, Bochove C.A.
 CWTS Working Paper Series 
Paper number CWTS-WP-2012-013 
Publication date November 1, 2012 
Number of pages 20 
Email address corresponding author cbochove@cwts.leidenuniv.nl 
Address CWTS Centre for Science and Technology Studies (CWTS) 
Leiden University 
P.O. Box 905 
2300 AX Leiden 
The Netherlands 
www.cwts.leidenuniv.nl 
Career policy and research output 
Cornelis van Bochove 
1 
 
Career policy and research output
1
 
Cornelis van Bochove
2
, CWTS, Leiden University 
October 2012 
1. Introduction 
University research careers are uniquely different from those of similarly qualified persons in 
other sectors. In most sectors, young people with a master degree from a university are 
initially hired for a short probationary period of a few years, and then, if successful, obtain a 
permanent contract. In research, obtaining a permanent contract (‘tenure’) often takes fifteen 
years and the fraction achieving it is far smaller. The initial probationary period until the 
awarding of a permanent contract typically has three parts: three to five or more years of PhD 
work, with a relatively low income, a number of years of temporary job (post-doc) contracts 
without the perspective of a permanent contract, and a number of years of a temporary 
contract with the perspective of permanence if successful (‘tenure track’). Clearly, this 
extreme selection period reduces the relative attractiveness of research careers and hence of 
education fields where research is one of the major career opportunities (e.g., many of the 
sciences). 
Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive description in the literature of this peculiar pattern, 
its international variation or its historical development. Nor is it clear why the system is as it 
is. Most likely, it is due to a combination of institutional and historical factors, and a 
conviction that it optimizes total research output. Some arguments in favor of the latter focus 
on the long learning process in research, but the most serious considerations refer to the high 
variance of research aptitude between individuals, the consequent need for sharp selection, 
and the long time this requires. This reasoning, however, has never been put on a rigorous 
base with an explicit formulation of key assumptions and a consistent analysis of their 
implications. Neither is there a satisfactory review of international salary patterns and 
personalized funding instruments that mitigate the rigidities of the standard career system. 
To provide such review information is part of the research program at CWTS, but beyond the 
scope of the present paper. Instead, this paper gives a rigorous analysis of the consequences of 
the pattern mentioned above by means of a simulation model and considers the consequences 
of variations in crucial parameters and policy instruments on national scientific production. In 
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particular, with respect to the instruments, we focus on the rate of selection for tenure and the 
time to tenure. With respect to the parameters, we focus on the distribution of talent and the 
relation between talent and actual output. In addition, we have to make some assumptions on 
the relation between age and productivity. 
2. The pipeline 
We distinguish two basic periods in a research career: before and after tenure. Let the number 
of years a person works in research be τ, with ߬ ൌ Ͳ at the start of research work, ߬ ൌ ߬௙ at 
tenure (f for faculty) and ߬ ൌ ߬௥ at retirement. Denote by ݉ሺݐǡ ݐ଴ሻ the size at time t of the 
cohort that started at time ݐ଴, let all persons start research at the same age and let retirement 
age be constant.  Total staff at t is then given by׬ ݉ሺݐǡ ݐ଴ሻ݀ݐ଴௧௧ିఛೝ . We analyze the dynamic 
equilibrium where the research budget, initial cohort size, selection and wage system are 
constant over time. Thus the situation of any cohort at time t depends on the value of ߬ ൌ ݐ െݐ଴ only, not on that of ݐ଴. This implies that we can simply write ݉ሺ߬ሻ for the size of any 
cohort of age ߬, and that all properties of the cohort depend on ߬ alone. 
In the initial stage of the research career the size of a cohort is affected by two factors: 
attrition and selection. Attrition is the autonomous dropping out of researchers; selection is 
the process where researchers with below average performance are weeded out. If the rates of 
attrition and selection are constant in the period till tenure, we have:   
   ݉ሺ߬ሻ ൌ ݉଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ   െͳ ൏ ߜǡ ߪ ൑ Ͳ  ߬ ൑ ߬௙        (1.1)  
Where ߜ is the rate of attrition1 and ߪ the rate of selection. At ߬௙ a fraction ߮ of the remaining 
cohort is selected for tenure, implying: ݉ሺ߬ሻ ൌ ߮݉଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑        ߬௙ ൏ ߬ ൑ ߬௥.        (1.2)  
After tenure there is no further selection or attrition until retirement. 
3. Wage regimes 
Research wage regimes usually are a mixture of two systems: age
2
 based or tenure based. In 
both regimes the initial wage, ݓ଴, can either be on a par with or below the initial wage in non-
research jobs at the same level of educational attainment. In age based systems the wage 
increases fairly rapidly, say at a rate ߣଵ, for a number of years (߬ଵ) and more slowly thereafter, 
say at a rate ߣଶ. In tenure based systems, there is a sharp break at the moment of obtaining 
tenure. In its extreme form, used in the past in parts of continental Europe, a full professor got 
a lifelong employment at a fixed wage (ݓ௙), independent of his age or experience, and no 
further increases until retirement, except for indexation for rises in the general level of wages. 
Before tenure, the wage increased with experience to a maximum considerably below the 
tenure wage. Of course, there are also less extreme forms, where wages of tenured staff do 
continue to increase, though at a fairly slow rate. 
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In order to analyze the relation between the choice of the tenure system and the salary system, 
we will separately consider these two wage regimes. For the age based system, we have: ݓሺ߬ሻ ൌ ݓ଴݁ఒభఛ                              ߣଵ ൐ Ͳ                                ߬ ൑ ߬ଵ             (2.1) ݓሺ߬ሻ ൌ ݓ଴݁ఒభఛభାఒమሺఛିఛభሻ         0൏ ߣଶ ൏ ߣଵ                              ߬ ൐ ߬ଵ              (2.2) 
For the tenure based system: ݓሺ߬ሻ ൌ ݓ଴݁ఒభఛ                                                                          ߬ ൑ ߬ଵ                     (3.1) ݓሺ߬ሻ ൌ ݓ௙݁ఒమఛ                           ݓ௙ ൒ ݓ଴݁ఒభఛ೑                       ߬ ൐ ߬ଶ                   (3.2) 
4. Cohort size 
We can now derive the initial cohort size ݉଴. Let b denote the science budget; for the age 
based wage system it is identically equal to: ܾ ൌ ׬ ݉ሺ߬ሻݓሺ߬ሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ݉ሺ߬ሻݓሺ߬ሻ݀߬୫ୟ୶ሺఛ೑ǡఛభሻ୫୧୬ሺఛ೑ǡఛభሻ ୫୧୬ሺఛ೑ǡఛభሻ଴ ൅ ׬ ݉ሺ߬ሻݓሺ߬ሻ݀߬ఛೝ୫ୟ୶ሺఛ೑ǡఛభሻ      (4.1) 
And for the tenure based system: ܾ ൌ ׬ ݉ሺ߬ሻݓሺ߬ሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ݉ሺ߬ሻݓሺ߬ሻ݀߬ఛೝఛ೑ ఛ೑଴                                                                            (4.2) 
Substituting (1.1), (1.2) and (3.1), (3.2) for ݉ሺ߬ሻ and ݓሺ߬ሻ, respectively, choosing the unit of 
measurement such that ܾ ൌ ͳ and integrating we obtain for the initial cohort size, or the 
inflow into the research system: ݉଴ ൌ ଵ௪బట                  (5) 
Here ߰ is given in table 1. ͳǤ߰
Age based  
 
  ߰ ൌ ௘ሺഃశ഑శഊభሻഓ೑ିଵఋାఙାఒభ ൅߮݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ ൬௘ഊభഓభି௘ഊభഓ೑ఒభ ൅ ௘ሺഊభషഊమሻഓభశഊమഓೝି௘ഊభഓభఒమ ൰߬௙ ൑ ߬ଵ  
  ߰ ൌ ݁ሺఋାఙାఒభሻఛభ െ ͳߜ ൅ ߪ ൅ ߣଵ ൅ ݁ሺఋାఙାఒమሻఛ೑ିఒమఛభ െ ݁ሺఋାఙሻఛభ ߜ ൅ ߪ ൅ ߣଶ ݁ఒభఛభ ൅ ݁ఒమఛೝ െ ݁ఒమఛ೑ߣଶ ߮݁ሺఒభିఒమሻఛభାሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ ߬௙ ൒ ߬ଵ 
 
Tenure based ߰ ൌ ݓ଴ሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఒభሻఛమ െ ͳሻߜ ൅ ߪ ൅ ߣଵ ൅߮ݓ௙݁ሺఋାఙିఒమሻఛమሺ݁ఒమఛೝ െ ͳሻߣଶ  
 
 
5. Productivity: learning and selection 
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Individual research productivity depends on research competence c (acquired skills), research 
aptitude a (talent) and random influences. Competence grows with experience, aptitude is 
constant, and the expectation of random influences is zero. As for competence, there is 
evidence that it grows rapidly until the age of 40, but continues growing thereafter, though 
slower. For simplicity, we assume that the periods of higher and lower growth of competence 
coincide with those of higher and lower growth of wages in the age based wage system. Thus, 
if c is competence, we have: ܿ ൌ ܿ଴݁ఊభఛ                                                                              ߬ ൑ ߬ଵ                           (6.1) ܿ ൌ ܿ଴݁ఊభఛభାఊమሺఛିఛభሻ                                                               ߬ ൐ ߬ଵ                    (6.2) 
where ߛଵ ൐ ߛଶ.We will refer, for example in table3 to these two expressions as c1 and c2, 
respectively. 
Employing a simple linear productivity function, and a proper unit of measurement of output, 
productivity per researcher, v, is: ݒ ൌ ܿ ൅ ܽ           (7) 
Let average aptitude at the start of a cohort be ܽ଴. As selection proceeds, average aptitude can 
at most be increased to the value ܽ௦ that is the expectation of a within the upper fraction s of 
the aptitude distribution. The value of ܽ௦ compared to ܽ଴ depends on the shape of the aptitude 
distribution. In bibliometric measurements of the output of individuals, a Pareto distribution is 
often found, at least for the tail of the distribution. As shown in appendix 1, this translates into 
a function: ܽ௦ ൌܽ଴ݏఏ                                                                   െͳ ൑ ߠ ൏ Ͳ               (8)  
In this specification, ܽ௦ remains at ܽ଴ as long as no selection has occurred, and becomes very 
large if only a small upper fraction remains. The value of the parameter ߠ is related to the 
skewness of the underlying Pareto distribution. If ߠ is close to zero, the distribution is very 
skewed and concentrated at the minimum aptitude. If ߠ is close to or equal to minus one, the 
distribution is flatter, that is, aptitudes vary more among individuals.  
The value of s follows from (1): ݏ ൌ ݁ఙఛ   (߬ ൑ ߬௙ሻ          ݏ ൌ ߮݁ఙఛ೑                            (9) 
Thus: ܽ௦ ൌܽ଴݁ఙఏఛ      (߬ ൑ ߬௙ሻ                               (10.1) ܽ௦ ൌܽ଴߮ఏ݁ఙఏఛ೑        (߬ ൐ ߬௙ሻ                         (10.2)  
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The actual average aptitude in any cohort depends on the degree to which the selection 
process is successful in selecting the upper part of the aptitude distribution. Individual 
aptitudes are unknown, and only individual output is observable. Since the latter depends on 
random influences as well as on competence and aptitude, output-based selection is prone to 
errors. However, as long as the random influence at time t is independent of that at time ݐ ′ and 
its expectation is zero, the cumulative error in any cohort declines with the age of the cohort 
at a rate that depends on the distribution function of the errors. In order to obtain an 
impression of the speed with which the cumulative error may fall with time, we analyzed in a 
separate paper
3
 the selection process for the case of discrete time and uniform distributions of 
both aptitude and errors. The table below provides the ratio of the expected value of a in the 
upper half of the output distribution to ܽ௦, for the case that the impact of random influences 
on output is equal in each period to that of aptitude itself (formally: they have the same 
absolute standard deviation). 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, in this case output-based selection provides a good approximation of aptitude 
selection, even after only one or two periods (a period could be two years or so). We describe 
the increase of actual aptitude with selection by a simple transition equation stating that actual 
aptitude increases from ܽ଴ to ܽ௦ in a period of T years: ܽ ൌ ܽ଴ ்ିఛ் ൅ ܽ௦ ఛ் ሺ߬ ൑ ܶሻ                                                    (11.1) ܽ ൌ ܽ௦ሺ߬ ൒ ܶሻ                                           (11.2) 
Inserting (10.1) and (10.2) yields four expressions for a, depending on the value of ߬ 
compared to those of ߬௙ and T, as indicated in table 2. ʹǤ߬ ൑ ௙߬ ǡ ܶ ܶ ൑ ߬ ൏ ௙߬  ߬ǡ ܶ ൐ ௙߬  ܶ ൑ ௙߬ ൏ ߬ ܽͳ ൌ ܽ଴ ்ିఛ் ൅ ܽ଴݁ఙఏఛ ఛ்   ܽʹ ൌ ܽ଴݁ఙఏఛ  ܽ͵ ൌ ܽ଴ ்ିఛ೑் ൅ ܽ଴߮ఏ݁ఙఏఛ೑ ఛ೑்  ܽͶ ൌ ܽ଴߮ఏ݁ఙఏఛ೑  
  
t ாሺ௔ሻ௔ೞ     t ாሺ௔ሻ௔ೞ   
1 0.89   6 0.98 
2 0.94   7 0.98 
3 0.96   8 0.99 
4 0.97   9 0.99 
5 0.98 10 0.99 
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6. Productivity and total output 
Combining the expressions for c and a, we have to distinguish six regimes for the value of 
productivity. These regimes occur as combinations of fast (F) and slow (S) granting of tenure 
with a high (H), medium (M) and low (L) random component in individuals’ output. ͵ݒሺ߬ሻ
Case Tenure 
Random 
comp. 
߬ ݒሺ߬ሻ ߬ ݒሺ߬ሻ ߬ ݒሺ߬ሻ ߬ ݒሺ߬ሻ ߬ଵ ൑ ߬௙ ൑ ܶ 
 
S H ߬ ൑ ߬ଵ c1+a1 ߬ଵ ൑ ߬ ൑ ߬௙ c2+a1 ߬௙ ൑ ߬ c2+a3   ߬௙ ൑ ߬ଵ ൑ ܶ 
 
F H ߬ ൑ ߬௙ c1+a1 ߬௙ ൑ ߬ ൑ ߬ଵ c1+a3 ߬ଵ ൑ ߬ c2+a3   ߬ଵ ൑ ܶ ൑ ߬௙  
 
S M ߬ ൑ ߬ଵ c1+a1 ߬ଵ ൑ ߬ ൑ ܶ c2+a1 ܶ ൑ ߬ ൑ ߬௙ c2+a2 ߬௙ ൑ ߬ c2+a4 ߬௙ ൑ ܶ ൑ ߬ଵ F M ߬ ൑ ߬௙ c1+a1 ߬௙ ൑ ߬ ൑ ߬ଵ c1+a3 ߬ଵ ൑ ߬ c2+a3   ܶ ൑ ߬ଵ ൑ ߬௙  S L ߬ ൑ ܶ c1+a1 ܶ ൑ ߬ ൑ ߬ଵ c1+a2 ߬ଵ ൑ ߬ ൑ ߬௙  c2+a2 ߬௙ ൑ ߬ c2+a4 ܶ ൑ ߬௙ ൑ ߬ଵ F L ߬ ൑ ܶ c1+a1 ܶ ൑ ߬ ൑ ߬௙ c1+a2 ߬௙ ൑ ߬ ൑ ߬ଵ c1+a4 ߬ଵ ൑ ߬ c2+a4 
          
Total output V is the sum of total output of non-tenured staff  and of tenured staff: ܸ ൌ ௡ܸ௙ ൅ ௙ܸ ൌ ׬ ݉ሺ߬ሻఛ೑଴ ݒሺ߬ሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ݉ሺ߬ఛೝఛ೑ ሻݒሺ߬ሻ݀߬ ൌ ݉଴ ׬ ݁ሺఋାఙሻఛఛ೑଴ ݒሺ߬ሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ߮݉଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ఛೝఛ೑ ݒሺ߬ሻ݀߬.   
The solution of these integrals is derived in appendix two. Because there are six regimes with 
respect to productivity and two wage systems, the result, summarized in table 4, is rather 
taxonomical. This precludes a fruitful algebraic analysis, so we turn to simulation to analyze 
the results. Ͷ ௡ܸ௙ ௙ܸ 
SH ߬ଵ ൑ ߬௙ ൑ ܶ ௡ܸ௙ ൌ ݉଴ሺܥͳ ൅ ܣͳሻ ௙ܸ ൌ ݉଴ሺܥͳ ൅ ܣͳሻ 
FH ߬௙ ൑ ߬ଵ ൑ ܶ ௡ܸ௙ ൌ ݉଴ሺܥʹ ൅ ܣͳሻ ௙ܸ ൌ ݉଴ሺܥͶ ൅ ܣ͵ሻ 
FM ߬௙ ൑ ܶ ൑ ߬ଵ 
SM ߬ଵ ൑ ܶ ൑ ߬௙ ௡ܸ௙ ൌ ݉଴ሺܥͳ ൅ ܣʹሻ ௙ܸ ൌ ݉଴ሺܥ͵ ൅ ܣͶሻ 
SL ܶ ൑ ߬ଵ ൑ ߬௙ 
FL ܶ ൑ ߬௙ ൑ ߬ଵ  ௡ܸ௙ ൌ ݉଴ሺܥʹ ൅ ܣʹሻ ௙ܸ ൌ ݉଴ሺܥͶ ൅ ܣͶሻ 
 ܥͳ ൌ ܿ଴ሾሺߜ ൅ ߪ ൅ ߛଵሻିଵሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛభ െ ͳሻ ൅ ሺߜ ൅ ߪ ൅ ߛଶሻିଵ݁ఊభఛభሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఊమሻఛ೑ିఊమఛభ െ ݁ሺఋାఙሻఛభሻሿ   ܥʹ ൌ ܿ଴ሺߜ ൅ ߪ ൅ ߛଵሻିଵሾ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛ೑ െ ͳሿ  ܥ͵ ൌ ܿ଴߮݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ାሺఊభିఊమሻఛభሺ݁ఊమఛೝ െ ݁ఊమఛ೑ሻߛଶି ଵ  ܥͶ ൌ ߮ܿ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሼሺ݁ఊభఛభ െ ݁ఊభఛ೑ሻߛଵି ଵ ൅݁ఊభఛభሺ݁ఊమఛೝିఊమఛభ െ ͳሻߛଶି ଵሽ  
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ܣͳ ൌ ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ ൤ଵିఛ೑Ȁ்ఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇഓ೑்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቀ߬௙ െ ଵఋାఙାఙఏቁ൨ െ ܽ଴ ቂ ଵఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ െ ଵ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻమቃ   ܣʹ ൌ ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻ் ቂ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ െ ௘഑ഇ೅்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻమቃ ൅ ௔బ௘ሺഃశ഑శ഑ഇሻഓ೑ఋାఙାఙఏ െ ܽ଴ ቂ ଵఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ െ ଵ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻమቃ   ܣ͵ ൌ ߮ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑൫ܶ െ ߬௙ ൅ ߮ఏ߬௙݁ఙఏఛ೑൯ሺ߬௥ െ ߬௙ሻܶିଵ  ܣͶ ൌ ܽ଴߮߮ఏ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻఛ೑ሺ߬௥ െ ߬௙ሻ  
 
7. Analysis of the results by simulation 
Basic scenario 
Table 5 provides an overview of the variations in parameter values we will consider. The first 
block gives the two parameters that determine just the scale of the model, not its essential 
mechanisms. We already set the total budget at one. Similarly, the initial wage rate determines 
the scale of labor; we set it at the rate at which one thousand researchers can be employed. 
The sum of initial competence and aptitude is the output of a newly starting researcher and 
determines the unit of measurement of output. We set it at one too. We will not consider 
variations in entry age, retirement age and ‘research maturity age’, but set these at 25, 65 and 
40, respectively, cf. the second block. ͷǤǤ ݓ଴ ͲǡͲͲͳ ͲǡͲͲʹ͵       ܿ଴ ൅ ܽ଴ ͳ         ߬௥ ͶͲ        ߬ଵ ͳͷ         ߛଵǡ ߣଵሺΨሻ Ͳ ͳ ʹǤͷ ͷ ͳͲ     ߛଶǡߣଶሺΨሻ Ͳ ͳ ʹǤͷ ͷ      ݓ௙ ݓ଴Τ  ͳ ʹ ͵ ͷ      ǣ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As a benchmark, the values in the first column of the next blocks describe the simplest: no 
learning, a constant wage throughout the career, no attrition or selection before tenure, a very 
compact aptitude distribution and a high degree of randomness in output. The result is shown 
in figure 1. Total output is plotted against time to tenure ߬௙ for different rates of selection. 
Naturally, without selection output is flat at one thousand. As soon as there is some selection, 
total output increases to a maximum as time to tenure increases and then starts to falls off 
again. Thus there is an optimal time to tenure that falls from 20 (halfway to retirement) if all 
researchers are granted tenure, to 7 if only five percent are tenured. 
The relation between selection and output is less straightforward. As selection becomes 
sharper, output at first increases, but eventually falls off again, if less than about a quarter of 
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 In the age based wage system 
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the researchers is tenured. Thus there is global maximum output, at a rate of selection of about 
one quarter and a time to tenure of about twelve. 
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Aptitude distribution 
The variations in output are of course very small in this scenario, since the impact of selection 
on aptitude is very mall. This changes as soon as aptitude distribution is less compact; figure 2 
displays the case of a more spread out aptitude distribution, with ߠ ൌ െͲǡͷ. This increases the 
impact of variations in selection and time to tenure on output almost tenfold. Moreover, the 
global optimum shifts to the left, and to a sharper rate of selection. 
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Both effects increase in strength if the attitude distribution is flatter yet, with ߠ at its minimum 
of -1, cf. figure 3. Note that here the global output maximum has shifted to the sharpest rate of 
selection (5%), and a time to tenure of 7. 
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Randomness of productivity 
It should be borne in mind that the basic scenario as shown in figures 1-3 assumes an 
extremely high level of randomness in productivity (T=40). The aptitude signal in output is 
largely swamped out by noise. At lower noise levels output is higher and optimal time to 
tenure falls, cf. figure 4. 
ͳͲͲͲͳͲͷͲ
ͳͳͲͲͳͳͷͲ
ͳʹͲͲͳʹͷͲ
ͳ͵ͲͲͳ͵ͷͲ
ͳͶͲͲ
ͳ ͵ ͷ ͹ ͻ ͳͳ ͳ͵ ͳͷ ͳ͹ ͳͻ ʹͳ ʹ͵ ʹͷ ʹ͹ ʹͻ
 
	 Ͷ  ǡ ሺɔൌͲǡ͵ሻǡ  ሺɅൌǦ Ͳǡͷሻ Ǥ
ͳͷ
͹Ǥͷͷ
͵
ʹͷ
ͳͲ
Ͷ
ʹͳ
ͶͲ ɒ

 
Based on intermediate values are used for the rate of selection and the skewness of aptitude 
distribution, optimal time to tenure no depends almost exclusively on the noise level in the 
aptitude signal: as soon as the level of aptitude can be fully ascertained from actual output, 
that is at T, selection for tenure should take place. Only at the highest noise levels (ܶ ൒ ͳͷሻ is 
the optimal time to tenure lower than T. At sharper rates of selection and flatter aptitude 
distribution (not shown here), the same relation holds, though at somewhat lower T and with 
substantially higher values of output. 
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Impact of tenure based wages 
That early selection for tenure can boost if randomness is low and wages are constant through 
life is not surprising. But what if wages increase with age and at tenure? This is considered in 
figure 5 for the tenure based wage system. We use the ‘central’ parameter values (bold in 
table 5) for aptitude distribution, randomness; and also for wages: tenured wage is three times 
the initial wage; the pre-tenure rate of growth of wages is five percent, post tenure that is 
down to 2.5 percent. However, we still retain the basic scenario absence of learning, and of 
pre-tenure selection and attrition. 
The pattern in figure 5 is familiar: an optimal time to tenure that is lower as selection is 
sharper. A difference with the previous cases is of course that the level of output is far 
smaller; this is not surprising, as fewer researchers can be paid from the same budget now that 
average lifelong wages are far higher. What is more striking is that output differences between 
different rates of selection and different times to tenure are far greater (up to two hundred 
percent) than with flat wages (no more than forty percent in the most extreme case). This does 
not mean, however, that the optimal time to tenure is shorter; on the contrary, it is ten years if 
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only five percent is selected for tenure, and a whopping twenty years or more if much more 
than one quarter is selected. What happens is that if selection is sharp, output is maximized if 
tenure is granted as soon as aptitudes are completely clear ሺ߬௙ ൌ ܶሻ, but if selection is not 
sharp, it pays to wait longer. 
How sensitive are these patterns to the assumptions made on the distribution of aptitude and 
on the size of the random component in output? Not very, cf. figures 5a-5c. Even with the 
flattest distribution of aptitudes (ߠ ൌ െͳሻ and a very low randomness of individuals’ output  
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(T=1), the same pattern holds, though sharper: at the highest selectivity it is profitable to 
select and grant tenure after a single year, in spite of the increase in wages this entails. But at 
lower selectivity, the increase in productivity is rapidly offset by increased cost after tenure, 
and optimal time to tenure rapidly increases, cf. figure 5d. 
The impact of tenure based wages on optimal time to tenure and selection depends heavily on 
the size of the salary hike at tenure, the ratio ݓ௙ ݓ଴Τ . This is illustrated in figures 5e, where 
the hike is reduced from 3 to 2 and 5f where optimal times to tenure for these values are 
compared (the other parameters are from the central scenario). At ݓ௙ ݓ଴ ൌΤ ʹ the times to 
tenure are lower throughout than at 3. 
Figure 5f. As 5, optimal time to tenure,
= 2 and 3                      
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Age based wages 
Something similar happens when we shift to age based wages. Since there now is no salary 
hike at tenure, lifelong labor cost tend to be lower. Naturally, given that the total budget is 
fixed, this implies higher output, which tends to obfuscate the comparison of the impact of the 
two systems on optimal time to tenure and rate of selection. To achieve some standardization, 
figure 6 employs an initial wage rate that is twice as high as that in figure 5, leading to a 
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similar level of output, particularly in the no selection case. For easy comparison, we 
reproduce figure 5 next to figure 6. Clearly, in the age based system, the optimal time to 
tenure is much shorter than if wages depend on the tenure decision. In fact, for a very wide 
range of selection rates, optimal time to tenure now depends on the degree of randomness of 
output only: as soon as the aptitude distribution is clear, output is optimized by granting 
tenure, even at moderate rates of selection. This changes, however, at lower rates of 
randomness, cf. figure 6b, when it is optimal only the sharpest rates of selection to select and 
grant tenure as soon as aptitude has become clear. If the rate of selection is in the range of 15-
60 percent, optimal time to tenure is in the range of 3-9 years, as long as randomness is low 
enough. 
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Figure 6b Optimal time to tenure, age based wages as in 6, T=5, 2, 1, respectively. 
Impact of learning. 
In figure 7 learning is introduced; for comparison, figure 6, where there is no learning, is 
shown. In the first 15 years of the research career competence grows at a rate of five percent, 
and after that 
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at 2.5 percent. Both rates are equal to the growth of wages in the same period. Clearly, 
learning does not alter the pattern of optimal tenure and selection significantly, though of 
course the level of output is increased substantially. This apparent irrelevance of the presence 
of learning for the basic policy decisions about selection and tenure vanishes if other patterns 
of learning prevail. Figure 8 gives three snapshots: one with a higher (ten percent) rate of 
learning in the initial part of the career, one without learning in the second part of the career, 
and one with a uniform five percent rate of learning throughout he career. 
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The case of very rapid learning in the first part of the career has some curious features. At this 
level of learning, the optimal rate of selection is not, as in all cases seen before, the sharpest 
possible rate (5 percent), but about 15 percent. Optimal time to tenure at that rate is 
determined by the randomness indicator, T, which stands at ten in this scenario. At still lower 
selection rates, maximum output drops off; the five percent curve has a remarkable shape, 
with a very short optimal time to tenure, a sharp drop after ten years, and an actual minimum 
output at 14 years, which happens to be close to standard times to tenure in the real world. Is 
this pattern caused by the sharp drop in learning after the first 15 year? No, it is not, as can be 
seen in figure 8b, where there is no learning after fifteen years. In fact, if learning is constant 
throughout the career (cf. 8c) one of the curious features of 8a returns, namely the sharp drop 
of output at high time to tenure. So what is happening? 
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In figure 9 the rate of learning is the same throughout the career. Selection is sharp at 5 
percent. At low rates of learning, we have the familiar pattern of an optimal time to tenure at 
4-7 years, and an output that falls uniformly at higher times to tenure. However, at a rate of 
learning of six, this changes and output starts to rise again at high times to tenure. If the rate 
of learning is higher still (9b),  we find a bathtub shape. The highest output is obtained if 
selection and tenure occur after a single year, at higher times to tenure output falls sharply 
until a minimum is reached at 17 years, and increases again at still higher times to tenure. In 
fact, if the time to tenure is extended beyond thirty years, output increases to a level beyond 
the original maximum. Thus, at these rates of learning, it is optimal not to select and grant 
tenure at all! The reason is clear: if there is a uniformly high rate of learning throughout the 
career, far in excess of the rate of growth wages, the ratio of output to cost is highest for the 
oldest researchers, and it is optimal to have as high a number of them as possible. 
Attrition and pre-tenure election. 
So far, we assumed that all researchers reached time to tenure, and that all selection took 
place at that time. In figure 10 we consider 3 percent rates of attrition and selection in the pre-
tenure period. Here we have a new phenomenon: if there is no or little selection at tenure, the 
highest output is attained if no tenure is granted at all. This is similar to what we found at high 
rates of learning: due to the continuous selection, the average productivity of older researchers 
continues to increase, and outpaces the growth of their wage. The impact of selection at tenure 
only surpasses the effect of continuation of pre-tenure selection if the rate of selection at 
tenure is sharp enough. 
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This, however is only part of the story, as is seen in 10b, where there is only attrition, not pre-
tenure selection. If selection at tenure is of minor importance, it is still optimal not to grant 
tenure at all, but to let the attrition continue all the way to retirement.   
8. Conclusion 
We developed a model to analyze the relation between the design of the career system in 
research and the total output of research systems. We focused in particular on the appointment 
to permanent positions (‘tenure’) and the sharpness of selection at that appointment. Our 
results show that there may be a strong impact of the time to tenure and the degree of 
selection on research output. The two most essential factors determining this impact are the 
skewdness of the distribution of research talent (‘aptitude’) and the size of random influences 
on individuals’ research output. The larger the latter, the more time is needed to determine the 
aptitude of individuals and the longer the optimal time to tenure is. 
Output and optimal time to tenure are also influenced by the degree to which research 
competence is acquired by experience and the extent to which this learning process continues 
at a later age. Finally, there is a considerable impact on optimal time to tenure and rates of 
selection of the wage system. A wage system that depends not on tenure decisions but simply 
on seniority (age) leads to shorter optimal times to tenure and might very well be more 
attractive to prospective young researchers than a system where wages are dependent on 
tenure, in spite of the fact that the former leads to a lower average wage. 
These conclusions imply that it is important to obtain empirical evidence on a number of 
characteristics of lifelong research output: 
1. The distribution of research output of individuals as an indication of the distribution of 
aptitude 
2. The fluctuations of an individual’s research output from period to period, as an 
indication of the random influences on output 
3. Systematic trends in individuals’ research output during their career, as an indication 
of learning. 
Reasonable assumptions on these characteristics indicate that a redesign of current career 
systems, with much faster, but strongly selective, tenure appointments, will not just increase 
the attractiveness of research as a career, but also increase research output. Therefore, 
research into the actual empirical value of the characteristics involved is highly relevant for 
the science of science policy.   
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Appendix 2. Derivation of the solutions for research output. 
Using table 3, the output of non-tenured and tenured staff is given in tables A.1 and A.2. The 
basic formulas for the solutions of the integrals in these tables are given in table A.3. 
 Table A.1 Non-tenured staff output. 
SH ߬ଵ ൑ ߬௙ ൑ ܶ ׬ ͳሺఛభ଴ ͳ ൅ ͵ሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ͳሺఛ೑ఛభ ʹ ൅ ͵ሻ݀߬  
FH ߬௙ ൑ ߬ଵ ൑ ܶ ׬ ͳሺఛ೑଴ ͳ ൅ ͳሻ݀߬  
SM ߬ଵ ൑ ܶ ൑ ߬௙ ׬ ͳሺఛభ଴ ͳ ൅ ͳሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ͳሺఛ்భ ʹ൅ ͳሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ͳሺఛ೑் ʹ ൅ ʹሻ݀߬  
FM ߬௙ ൑ ܶ ൑ ߬ଵ ׬ ͳሺఛ೑଴ ͳ ൅ ͳሻ݀߬  
SL ܶ ൑ ߬ଵ ൑ ߬௙ ׬ ͳሺ଴் ͳ ൅ ͳሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ͳሺఛభ் ͳ ൅ ʹሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ͳሺఛ೑ఛభ ʹ൅ ʹሻ݀߬  
FL ܶ ൑ ߬௙ ൑ ߬ଵ ׬ ͳሺ଴் ͳ ൅ ͳሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ͳሺఛ೑் ͳ ൅ ʹሻ݀߬  ͳ ൌ ݉଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ  
Table A.2 Tenured staff output. 
SH ߬ଵ ൑ ߬௙ ൑ ܶ ׬ ʹሺఛೝఛ೑ ʹ൅ ͵ሻ݀߬  
FH ߬௙ ൑ ߬ଵ ൑ ܶ ׬ ʹሺఛభఛ೑ ͳ ൅ ͵ሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ʹሺఛೝఛభ ʹ ൅ ͵ሻ݀߬  
SM ߬ଵ ൑ ܶ ൑ ߬௙ ׬ ʹሺఛೝఛ೑ ʹ൅ Ͷሻ݀߬  
FM ߬௙ ൑ ܶ ൑ ߬ଵ ׬ ʹሺఛభఛ೑ ͳ ൅ ͵ሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ʹሺఛೝఛభ ʹ ൅ ͵ሻ݀߬   
SL ܶ ൑ ߬ଵ ൑ ߬௙ ׬ ʹሺఛೝఛ೑ ʹ൅ Ͷሻ݀߬  
FL ܶ ൑ ߬௙ ൑ ߬ଵ ׬ ʹሺఛభఛ೑ ͳ ൅ Ͷሻ݀߬ ൅ ׬ ʹሺఛೝఛభ ʹ ൅ Ͷሻ݀߬  ʹ ൌ ݉଴߮ఏ݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑   
Table A.3 Primitive functions of the components of ௡ܸ௙ and ௙ܸ 
Component Primitive function ׬ ݂ሺ ߬ሻ݀߬ 
m1 c1=݁ሺఋାఙሻఛܿ଴݁ఊభఛ ܿ଴݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛሺߜ ൅ ߪ ൅ ߛଵሻିଵ 
m1 c2=݁ሺఋାఙሻఛܿ଴݁ఊభఛభାఊమሺఛିఛభሻ ܿ଴݁ሺఊభିఊమሻఛభାሺఋାఙାఊమሻఛሺߜ ൅ ߪ ൅ ߛଶሻିଵ 
m1 a1=݁ሺఋାఙሻఛሼܽ଴ ்ିఛ் ൅ ܽ଴݁ఙఏఛ ఛ்ሽ ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛሾଵିఛȀ்ఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇഓ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቀ߬ െ ଵఋାఙାఙఏቁሿ    
m1 a2=݁ሺఋାఙሻఛܽ଴݁ఙఏఛ ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻఛሺߜ ൅ ߪ ൅ ߪߠሻିଵ ௙ܸ 
m2 c1=݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ܿ଴݁ఊభఛ  ߮ ߛଵି ଵ߮ܿ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ାఊభఛ 
m2 c2=߮݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ܿ଴݁ఊభఛభାఊమሺఛିఛభሻ ߛଶି ଵܿ଴߮݁ሺఊభିఊమሻఛభାఊమఛାሺఋାఙሻఛ೑  
m2 a3=߮݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሾܽ଴ ்ିఛ೑் ൅ ܽ଴߮ఏ݁ఙఏఛ೑ ఛ೑்ሿ ߮ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺܶ െ ߬௙ ൅߮ఏ߬௙݁ఙఏఛ೑ሻ߬ܶିଵ  ʹͶ ൌ ܽ଴߮ఏ݁ఙఏఛ೑߮݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ ܽ଴߮߮ఏ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻఛ೑߬ 
Note: ׬ݔߙ݁௕௫݀ݔ ൌ ߙߚିଵ݁ఉ௫ ሺݔ െ ߚିଵሻ 
The results of applying these solutions to the integrals in tables A.1 and A.2 are provided in 
tables A.4 and A.5. Reshuffling yields the expressions given in table 4 in the main text. 
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Table A.4 Solution of the integrals of ௡ܸ௙(omitting ݉଴) 
 
Table A.5. Solution of the integrals of ௙ܸ(omitting ݉଴) 
 First integral Second integral 
SH 
ܿ଴߮݁ሺఊభିఊమሻఛభାሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺ݁ఊమఛೝ െ ݁ఊమఛ೑ሻߛଶି ଵ ൅ ߮ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑൫ܶ െ ߬௙ ൅ ߮ఏ߬௙݁ఙఏఛ೑൯ሺ߬௥ െ ߬௙ሻܶିଵ  
FH 
߮ܿ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺ݁ఊభఛభ െ ݁ఊభఛ೑ሻߛଵି ଵ+ ߮ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺܶ െ ߬௙ ൅ ߮ఏ߬௙݁ఙఏఛ೑ሻሺ߬ଵ െ ߬௙ሻܶିଵ ܿ଴߮݁ሺఊభିఊమሻఛభାሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺ݁ఊమఛೝ െ ݁ఊమఛభሻߛଶି ଵ+ ߮ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺܶ െ ߬௙ ൅߮ఏ߬௙݁ఙఏఛ೑ሻሺ߬௥ െ ߬ଵሻܶିଵ 
SM 
ܿ଴߮݁ሺఊభିఊమሻఛభାሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺ݁ఊమఛೝ െ ݁ఊమఛ೑ሻߛଶି ଵ ൅ ൅ܽ଴߮߮ఏ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻఛ೑ሺ߬௥ െ ߬௙ሻ  
FM 
߮ܿ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺ݁ఊభఛభ െ ݁ఊభఛ೑ሻߛଵି ଵ+ ߮ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑൫ܶ െ ߬௙ ൅ ߮ఏ߬௙݁ఙఏఛ೑൯ሺ߬௥ െ ߬௙ሻܶିଵ ܿ଴߮݁ሺఊభିఊమሻఛభାሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺ݁ఊమఛೝ െ ݁ఊమఛభሻߛଶି ଵ+ + ߮ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑൫ܶ െ ߬௙ ൅߮ఏ߬௙݁ఙఏఛ೑൯ሺ߬௥ െ ߬௙ሻܶିଵ 
SL 
ܿ଴߮݁ሺఊభିఊమሻఛభାሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺ݁ఊమఛೝ െ ݁ఊమఛ೑ሻߛଶି ଵ ൅ ൅ܽ଴߮߮ఏ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻఛ೑ሺ߬௥ െ ߬௙ሻ  
FL 
߮ܿ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺ݁ఊభఛభ െ ݁ఊభఛ೑ሻߛଵି ଵ+ ൅ܽ଴߮߮ఏ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻఛ೑ሺ߬ଵ െ ߬௙ሻ ܿ଴߮݁ሺఊభିఊమሻఛభାሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ሺ݁ఊమఛೝ െ ݁ఊమఛభሻ ߛଶି ଵ ൅ܽ଴߮߮ఏ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻఛ೑ሺ߬௥ െ ߬ଵሻ 
The results of applying these solutions to the integrals in tables A.1 and A.2 and reshuffling 
yields the expressions given in table 4 in the main text. 
 First integral  Second integral   Third integral 
SH ௖బఋାఙାఊభ ሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛభ െ ͳሻ ൅ ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛభ  ቂଵିఛభ ்Τఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇഓభ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቀ߬ଵ െ ଵఋାఙାఙఏቁቃ  െܽ଴ ቂ ଵఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ െ ଵ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻమቃ   
௖బఋାఙାఊమ ሺ݁ሺఊభିఊమሻఛభାሺఋାఙାఊమሻఛ೑ െ ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛభሻ    ൅ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑ ቈଵିഓ೑೅ఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇഓ೑ቀఛ೑ି భഃశ഑శ഑ഇቁ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቉  െܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛభ ቈଵିഓభ೅ఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇഓభቀఛభି భഃశ഑శ഑ഇቁ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቉   
 
FH ௖బఋାఙାఊభ ൫݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛ೑ െ ͳ൯ ൅ ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑  ൤ଵିఛ೑ ்Τఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇഓ೑்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቀ߬௙ െ ଵఋାఙାఙఏቁ൨  െܽ଴ ቂ ଵఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ െ ଵ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻమቃ  
  
SM ௖బఋାఙାఊభ ሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛభ െ ͳሻ ൅ ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛభ  ቂଵିఛభ ்Τఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇഓభ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቀ߬ଵ െ ଵఋାఙାఙఏቁቃ  െܽ଴ ቂ ଵఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ െ ଵ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻమቃ  
௖బఋାఙାఊమ ൫݁ሺఊభିఊమሻఛభାሺఋାఙାఊమሻ் െ ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛభ൯ ൅ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻ் ቈ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇ೅ቀ்ି భഃశ഑శ഑ഇቁ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቉ െ  ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛభ ቈଵିഓభ೅ఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇഓభቀఛభି భഃశ഑శ഑ഇቁ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቉  ൅
ܽ଴ሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻఛ೑ െ ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ்ሻߜ ൅ ߪ ൅ ߪߠ  
௖బ௘ሺംభషംమሻഓభఋାఙାఊమ ൬݁ሺఋାఙାఊమሻఛ೑ െ݁ሺఋାఙାఊమሻ் ൰  
FM ௖బఋାఙାఊభ ሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛ೑ െ ͳሻ ൅ ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻఛ೑  ൤ଵିఛ೑ ்Τఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇഓ೑்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቀ߬௙ െ ଵఋାఙାఙఏቁ൨  െܽ଴ ቂ ଵఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ െ ଵ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻమቃ  
  
SL ௖బఋାఙାఊభ ሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻ் െ ͳሻ൅ ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻ்  ቈ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇ೅ቀ்ି భഃశ഑శ഑ഇቁ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቉ െ  ܽ଴ ቂ ଵఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ െ ଵ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻమቃ  
௖బఋାఙାఊభ ሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛభ െ ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻ்ሻ ൅   ௔బఋାఙାఙఏ ሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻఛభ െ ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ்ሻ  ௖బ௘ሺംభషംమሻഓభశሺഃశ഑శംమሻഓ೑ି௘ሺഃశ഑శംభሻഓభఋାఙାఊమ   ൅ܽ଴ ௘ሺഃశ഑శ഑ഇሻഓ೑ି௘ሺഃశ഑శ഑ഇሻഓభఋାఙାఙఏ   
FL ௖బఋାఙାఊభ ሺ݁ఊభ் െ ͳሻ ൅ ܽ଴݁ሺఋାఙሻ்  ቈ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ ൅ ௘഑ഇ೅ቀ்ି భഃశ഑శ഑ഇቁ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ ቉ െ  ܽ଴ ቂ ଵఋାఙ ൅ ଵ்ሺఋାఙሻమ െ ଵ்ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻమቃ  
௖బఋାఙାఊభ ሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻఛ೑ െ ݁ሺఋାఙାఊభሻ்ሻ ൅  ௔బఋାఙାఙఏ ሺ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻఛ೑ െ ݁ሺఋାఙାఙఏሻ்ሻ   
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1
 A positive value for delta is not logically impossible: it would mean that a cohort acquires additional 
researchers after its start; with the same characteristics (wage, average aptitude, level of competence) 
the other researchers in the cohort have at τ. This can be (and in fact is) achieved by international 
migration. Analyzing this is , however, beyond our scope 
2
 Strictly: experience 
3
 Cornelis van Bochove (2010) Expectation of a uniform random variable with uniform observation 
errors after selection of the highest observations, Statistical Papers, DOI 10.1007/s00362-009-0304-y 
